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The Charter The Charter of fundamental rights of the European 
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The Supreme Courts The supreme administrative court and the supreme 
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SUMMARY.  
Ne bis in idem is an evolving and current topic of EU law1 where recent case law has 
affected its application. The Swedish tax system contains administrative proceedings that 
can result in fines that can thereafter be followed (or initiated) with a criminal offence 
proceeding. The ECtHR2 revised its view on the Ne bis in Idem in Zolothukin v Russia and 
concluded that the Identity of the facts was decisive for if two proceedings concerned the 
same- Idem.  
The Swedish Supreme courts weighed this new practice and acknowledged it when they 
delivered verdict in NJA 2010 s 168 I & II but they made the assessment that they needed 
“klart stöd” (clear support) from the ECHR or the ECtHR3 case law to be able to reject the 
system of dual proceedings within Swedish tax laws. This decision was both criticized and 
debated. 
The principle of Ne bis in Idem received a broader base for interpretation with the recent 
judgment from ECJ in the case of Åkerberg Fransson C-617/10, the so called Haparanda 
Case,4 in the area of administratively imposed fines. It discusses both the nature of the 
proceedings, the offence and the “klart stöd” doctrine. The findings by the ECJ are likely to 
affect both Swedish tax laws as well as other areas of dual proceedings and administratively 
imposed fines within the European Union. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent cases from the ECJ and ECtHR imply that their relation to the principle of Ne Bis in 
Idem have changed and evolved with a result affecting many areas of law. This is a limited 
analysis of the principle of Ne bis in Idem in the light of the recent judgment from ECJ in, the 
Haparanda Case in the area of administratively imposed fines. 
                                                        
1 European Union Law, further referred to as the EU law 
2 European court of justice of Human Rights, further referred to as ECtHR 
3 European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
4 Åkerberg Fransson C-617/10 further referred to as the Haparanda case 
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The Lisbon treaty became active first of December 2009 and with it the European Union 
became a sui generis entity and as such it is according to article 6 TEU going to accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms5 in the 
near future. Human Rights were already before recognized as general principles of law 
within the EU law. With the Lisbon treaty the Charter of fundamental rights of the European 
Union6 became an encoded version of those principles and is almost identical with the ECHR. 
The Charter was also given status as EU law.7 The ECHR were also given a new status through 
the article 52(3) of the charter as will be discussed further below. 
With the pending accession to the ECHR the European Union have to find ways to adapt 
to the existing case law of the ECtHR to avoid future conflict.  
The principle of Ne bis in Idem has a somewhat unclear meaning within both the Charter 
and the ECHR. The latest case-law regarding this principle came out of the ECJ in February 
this year. The Haparanda case8 casted some light into how the principle is interpreted in EU 
law in connection to the Charter and its relation to the ECtHR. 
In the famous case of Zolothukin v Russia9 it has been considered that the ECtHR 
changed its previous practice and harmonized their field in the area of the Ne bis in Idem 
principle. The ECtHR position was revised into an understanding that the double punishment 
prohibition was now to be considered as a prohibition from a second trial or prosecution, if 
that meant that a second offence got tried on substantially the same or identical facts as the 
first offence. The Haparanda case10 was the first case on the Ne bis in Idem principle to come 
out of ECJ after the Zolothukin judgment.   
Previous to the Haparanda- case the Swedish supreme court had through case law 
concluded that, still after the Zolothukin case, there were no existing conflict between the 
                                                        
5 Further referred to ac the ECHR 
6 Further referred to as The Charter 
7 article 6(1) TEU gives the Charter  the same legal value as the treaties 
8 Åkerberg Fransson C-617/10 further referred to as the Haparanda case 
9 Sergey Zolothukin v. Russia no 14939/03 further referred to as Zolotukhin. 
10 Åkerberg Fransson C-617/10 
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Swedish Tax System giving a person tax surcharges administratively by SKV11 at the same 
time (or before or after) as the same person gets punished by the Swedish court for tax 
offences based on the same information.12 According to the Supreme courts13 it was not a 
violation of the Ne bis in Idem principle14 since they interpreted the idem to be different in 
the parallel proceedings. 
The Ne bis in Idem principle  is incorporated in various international laws and treaties, 
amongst them article 6 and 7 of the ECHR  and also article 4 of protocol no 7 to the ECHR and 
article 50 of the Charter, that all three have status as legal sources in Swedish law. 
The view taken by the Swedish supreme courts have been far from uncontroversial and 
have been criticized from several different sources15 claiming that the view of the Supreme 
Court in Sweden and the combination of tax surcharges and proceedings for tax offences is 
not compatible with the principle of the Ne bis in Idem. Several lower courts in Sweden have 
even decided to go against the praxis from the higher court, a practice that became known 
as the HD-uprising in Sweden.16 Many were hoping that the preliminary rulings in the 
Haparanda case, which rose out of a district courts referral to ECJ,17 were going to finally put 
an end to the discussions about the Swedish surcharges. The question is if it really did and 
what can actually be deducted from wordings by the ECJ in the Haparanda case and also if 
any parallels can be drawn from prior case-law on the Ne bis in Idem principle, from both the 
ECJ and the ECtHR. 
The Swedish system contains of two separate procedures for not supplying the 
authorities with information or supplying them with false information that could or have led 
to that the commission is losing tax. One procedure is carried out by the Swedish tax 
authority, SkV, by which they are adding tax surcharges as a penalty for false information 
without any consideration to weather it was done with intent or by mistake. This is 
                                                        
11 Skatteverket – the Swedish tax authority further referred to as SKV 
12 NJA 2010 p168 I and II 
13 Amongst others NJA 2010 p168 I and II 
14 When someone have been convicted of the offence by the SkbrL, skattebrottslagen and than afterwards 
also receives the administrative tax surcharges. 
15 Artiklar och böcker samt skiljande meningar 
16 HD is the abbreviation is Sweden for the Swedish Supreme court. 
17 Tingsrätten in Haparanda, a first instance court 
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considered to be an administrative procedure within Sweden. Another separate procedure 
takes place if the incorrect information is also found to be a serious enough breach of 
Swedish Tax Laws to be suspected of being a tax offence. This is criminal proceedings, taking 
place in front of a court, where except for the incorrect information also a certain amount of 
guilt or at least negligence is needed to cast a verdict. The sentencing in the criminal court 
takes no regard to the facts of previous tax surcharges or not, regardless of their size. If the 
administrative proceedings start after the criminal proceedings have reached a verdict that 
has become final. The SkV18 has a possibility to reduce the tax surcharge if it would be 
offensive otherwise, but it is rarely applicable since the administrative procedure often 
foregoes the criminal proceedings and for the SkV to be able to reduce the tax surcharges 
the criminal proceedings have to have ended and reached a verdict which has become final. 
The Ne bis in Idem principle does not only affect the area of taxes when it concerns the 
combination of administrative fines and other punishments, many countries and the 
commission for example are using similar parallel proceedings of both administrative type 
and penalty for offences in a way that might become affected in various ways of this latest 
ruling over the Ne bis in Idem principle. 
1.1  QU ESTION AND PURPOSE  
As the Charter became part of EU law it meant that all EU reforms and also domestic 
laws had to adapt and become in line with the rules of the Charter.  The enhanced value of 
the human rights within the EU law through the Charter and the principle of Ne bis in Idem 
have been widely discussed but the situation is still far from clear.  The fact that most 
member states are already part of the ECHR from which the Charter is modeled does not 
seem to have rendered it uncontroversial. The EUs pending accession19  to the ECHR might 
also affect the interpretations by the ECJ in this field. The recently delivered judgment from 
the ECJ in the case of Åkerberg/Fransson C-617/10,20 called the Haparanda case, have 
                                                        
18 The Swedish tax authority further referred to by its Swedish abbreviation SkV 
19 Article 6(2) TEU 
20 Åkerberg/Fransson C-617/10 further referred to as the Haparanda case 
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implications for the application of Swedish tax laws and combined administrative fines 
without the European Union.  
This thesis will try to investigate what the Haparanda case could mean for the Ne bis in 
Idem principle from the perspective of the Swedish tax system with combined administrative 
proceedings and criminal proceedings for certain tax offences. To be able to investigate that 
question the thesis will have to start with a brief explanation into the principle of Ne bis in 
Idem itself. What status does it have, when and how is it applicable within respectively EU 
legal order and the ECHR?  
What was the opinion of the Supreme court in Sweden previous to the Haparanda case 
on the application of the principle of Ne bis in Idem and then finally by going through and 
interpreting the judgment in the Haparanda case in the light of previous case law and 
interpret what it might mean for the future application of the Ne bis In Idem principle, 
especially on combined administrative fines and other criminal punishment.  
1.2  METHOD AND MATERIALS :  
Method used is a traditional legal dogmatic method. It is carried out by comparing and 
analyzing case law and the status of existing law in the matter at hand.  
The focus is on the principle of Ne bis in idem in EU law and its relationship to ECHR and 
the Member states domestic laws, mainly the Swedish tax system with tax surcharges in 
combination with criminal sanctions. 
 Article 6 (3) TEU states that the ECHR is general principles of EU law and article 6(1) TEU 
that the Charter shall have the same legal value as the treaties21 therefore I will look at both 
                                                        
21 Article 6 TEU 
1. The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 
2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as 
defined in the Treaties. 
The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and 
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case law from the ECtHR and the ECJ and also look after any relations between judgment in 
the ECJ and previous judgments in the ECtHR. 
Many books have been consulted to both find a deeper understanding of EU law and 
specific areas and several articles have been used to look at how the legal discussions 
surrounding the principle of Ne bis in Idem, particularly in relation to tax law and the new 
Haparanda case. 
1.3  TERMINOLOGY  
The Lisbon treaty meant that a lot of articles got new numbering and I will use the new 
article numbering throughout this essay and concepts that changed names will use the 
present concepts.22 
With the ECJ I refer to the highest court within the European Union. 
 Supreme Court in Sweden refers to the highest court in Sweden in that area. 
Supreme administrative court refers to the highest court in Sweden in the area of 
administrative decisions. 
Supreme Courts in Sweden refers two both supreme courts mentioned above 
Within the EU law the concept of Ne bis in Idem is often referred to as the prohibition of 
Double jeopardy, but I will consistently use the Ne bis in Idem – principle in its place except 
for in quotes.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those 
provisions. 
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the 
Treaties. 
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law. 
22 Ex common market are now referred to as the Internal market. 
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The Court will refer to the court of the ECJ or ECtHR depending on the case discussed and 
the domestic court to the referring domestic court at all levels. 
1.4  DELIMITATIONS  
The principle of Ne bis in Idem is an old concept and it is used in several international 
laws, treaties and have had many different layers of meaning through time and cultures. To 
investigate the impact of the principle in its whole would not be possible in a thesis like this 
one, not even the concept within a field of EU law is possible within the scope of this essay. 
I have chosen to focus on how the principle can be understood through a limited amount 
of very specific cases and its evolvement between the ECtHR and the ECJ through them, 
even if the thesis by no means should be interpreted as a record of a finished and clear 
development of the Ne bis in Idem principle, rather it should be seen as a snapshot of the 
situation at the moment and possible further development. 
 My main focus will be on the latest Haparanda case and the relation between the 
Charter and the ECHR in the area of tax law and Swedish surcharges in the light of new praxis 
from ECJ and ECtHR.  
Since the principle has a wide application through EU law I will also make a contextual 
analysis of how ECtHR and ECJ have discussed about fines in competition regarding the 
application of the Ne bis in Idem principle and the meaning of Idem. 
1.5  OUTLINE  
In the first chapters of this thesis the European taxsystem in general is explained to give a 
background to how the tax laws are integrating between domestic laws and harmonized 
area of EU law. That is followed by the referral process to the ECJ and what demands that EU 
law puts on the member states that are connected to the tax field. 
Then the Chapter of Ne bis in Idem is trying to give an overview of the principle in itself and 
how it is expressed through ECHR, EU law and the Swedish domestic law to explain key 
elements before explaining the cases. 
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Before going in to the Cases it is also necessary to get an understanding and brief 
background into the Swedish tax system and both the parallel proceedings of administrative 
fines and criminal punishment and also the doctrine of Klart Stöd that the Supreme Court in 
Sweden is using to decide when a rule should be declared invalid due to its possible 
incompatibility with ECHR. 
Then the recent development between the ECHR and EU Law is briefly touched upon before 
the descriptions of the Engels criterions that are used by both the ECtHR and the ECJ to 
investigate the nature of an act or omission. 
That is followed by an explanation to the notion of idem – how is the word the same in the 
principle of Ne Bis in Idem interpreted In general and what will the accession to the ECHR 
mean for the tax field and the Ne bis in Idem. 
That is followed by a study of the relevant case law presented through the ECtHR cases in 
order of delivery and then followed by two cases of major importance from the ECJ with the 
main focus on the Haparanda case. 
The finishing chapters are analyzing the development through the case law presented of the 
interpretations of the criminal heading and then the Idem. The thesis is ended with general 
conclusions of the development between the ECHR, the Charter and the EU law discussing 
possible reasons for the judgments and also discussing the implication it might have for the 
Swedish tax system and possible future development.   
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2.  GENERALLY ABOUT EU  AND TAXES .  
Already in the famous cases of Vand Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL the ECJ made it 
clear that the membership in the European Union meant that the member states would 
have to adapt to far reaching consequences within their own legal systems.23  The member 
states have all signed over part of their sovereignty to the EU by signing the different 
treaties. The latest treaty signed is the Lisbon treaty which was signed in the year of 2007 
and became active from first of December 2009, thereby the EU became a sui generis- entity 
and the Charter was given the same legal value as the treaties themselves.24 This means that 
EU law and the Charter is now superior to domestic law in the Member States. This have far 
reaching consequences on all territories of domestic law and so also on tax laws, as will be 
explained briefly later in this essay. 
 Even if a country in theory is free to adopt whatever taxes it wants, how it wants and the 
jurisdiction to apply taxes are considered a manifestation of countries sovereignty that is not 
the case in reality. Taxes are influenced by neighboring countries tax policies, by tax 
agreements and by other agreements that have the effect of limiting the scope of the tax 
applications and it is also affected by basic rights of international law. 
In the case of Avoir Fiscal25  it became clear that the field of direct taxation also could be 
affected and have to adapt to European Law, as the ECJ established that taxes that limited 
the freedom of establishment could be in violation of the treaties. Avoir Fiscal was decided 
upon in the early eighties and since then this interpretation has been developed further and 
it is today clear that taxes do not contain a free zone for member states to regulate as they 
see fit. The treaties put limits to this freedom and now also the Charter. 
The EU law is designed to protect situations of a cross border character and therefore 
only applies to situations where European Union law is somehow applicable.  
                                                        
23 Vand Gend & Loos C-26/62 and Costa v. ENEL C-6/64 
24 Article 6(1) TEU 
25 Avoir Fiscal C-270/83 
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A cross border situation that is protected exists if the situation violates the treaty 
freedoms and also if it leads to negative consequences in the cross border situation 
compared to wholly internal situation of similar kind. 
To suffer more taxes due to a cross border situation but where none of the member 
states involved is in fact treating the subject in the cross border situation worse than an 
internal situation, does breach of the EU law.  States are allowed to use parallel taxation 
even when it is burdensome for the cross border active party. But they cannot target them 
directly or indirectly.                                                                                                                                                     
 The EU law is divided into primary and secondary law. Primary law contains of the 
treaties and their amendment that is negotiated and ratified by the member states, and is 
superior to EU secondary law. Whereas the secondary law is created by decisions made by 
the different EU institutions and the central legal acts are mentioned in article 288 TFEU.  
2.1  INDIRECT AND DIRECT TAX-  HARMONIZATION ARTICLE 113-115  
TFEU 
In the field of taxation there are regulations, directives and recommendations that can 
be used to harmonize the field for all member states. The tax field is divided between direct 
taxation and indirect taxation. 
Article 113 TFEU directly gives orders to the council to make decisions that harmonizes 
the indirect taxation field within the EU and it has used that competence extensively. The 
Vat directive26 leaves little room for the member states own ways of implementation. The 
area is so harmonized that it can almost be seen as a law in itself. 
 According to article 115 TFEU the Council is to create directives that makes the laws of 
the different member states more harmonized, it is a general harmonization clause. Article 
115 probably makes it impossible to create any directives, regulations and similar that 
moves in opposite direction. Considering the strict interpretation of the wording in article 
                                                        
26 Council directive  2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 also referred to as the VAT directive 
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114 TFEU by the ECJ in the Tobacco advertising case27 one can expect that since article 115 
consists of stricter wordings than article 114 that implies that it also should be implied 
strictly, meaning that article 113 and 115 TFEU cannot be used to harmonize the tax field in 
areas of national tax measures that are not considered as trade barriers within the scope of 
the treaties. 28 
 All kind of decisions29 by the council in tax matters have to be made unanimously and 
this grows increasingly harder and more difficult as more member states annexes. The 
growing number of member states slows down the process of harmonization in the field of 
taxation and suggestions have been made by the commission at several occasions to change 
this at least in parts to a qualified majority instead, but so far without success.30  
2.2  DIRECT TAXATION IN EU  LAW  
Direct taxation is mainly a non harmonized field within EU law. The ECJ have in several 
cases found domestic direct taxation in conflict with the treaties in areas like free movement 
of capital and non discrimination which can lead to the domestic rule being invalid.  
The field of direct taxation is mostly regulated through the courts case law, often with a 
reference to the Member States that they should exercise their competence over the direct 
tax field in consistency with Union Law, which is respect to the free movement rights that 
taxpayers have and also to observe State aid prohibitions.31  
The member states view direct taxation as an important part of their sovereignty and 
there is very little interest from politicians to harmonize this part of the tax field. But that 
reluctant participation has lead to consequences like “a large and rapidly expanding body of 
casuistically and thus uncoordinated case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, often fatal for the 
                                                        
27 Tobacco Advertising C-380/03 
28 Traditional and alternative routes to European Tax Integration edited by Dennis Weber 2010 IBFD  p18 
29 Com v. Council C-338/01 
30  European Tax Law Ben.J.M.Terra, Peter J. Wattel Wolter Kluwer Law & Business 2012, sixth edition 
chapter 2 
31 European Tax Law Ben.J.M.Terra, Peter J. Wattel Wolter Kluwer Law & Business 2012 p 10 
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national direct tax measure at issue because of incompatibility with the TFEU freedoms.”32 The fact 
that it is not an harmonized area of EU law means that the cases are variegated and covers 
several different but small areas where a conflict have taken place between a specific 
domestic rule in a member state and EU law. This leaves a lot of gray and unclear zones and 
as of yet not specified areas between domestic direct taxation and EU law that are waiting to 
be interpreted. 
3.  REFERRAL TO THE ECJ   
The Commission or a member state can start a procedure according to article 258 and 
259 TFEU. The principle of Jura novit curia does not apply in a domestic court if a matter of 
EU law is in question. Instead there is an obligation to refer unless it is an Act Claire or an 
Acte Éclair.33 
Under article 267 TFEU domestic courts can transfer cases for preliminary rulings to the 
ECJ. 
The possibility to refer cases for preliminary rulings is only available for courts. Tax 
authorities like Skatteverket34 cannot ask for preliminary rulings but they are still expected 
not to breach any of the EU laws regardless of if the situation has previously been clarified or 
not. 
This leads to certain complications for the tax authorities in situations which is not clear 
to them on how it should be interpreted when it comes to the relationship with the EU 
treaties.35  
3.1  DEMANDS FOR CONFORMITY  
                                                        
32 European Tax Law Ben.J.M.Terra, Peter J. Wattel Wolter Kluwer Law & Business 2012 p 5 
33 CILFIT C-283/81; only if an interpretation of EU law is so clear that all states and the ECJ would reach 
the same conclusion can a member state neglect to refer and decide over the result of the interpretation of 
the effect of a EU law. There is no room for doubt. If the question has already been referred in a previous 
matter and decided upon by the ECJ then the question doesn’t need to be referred again. 
34 Skatteverket, the Swedish Tax Authority, further referred to as SKV 
35 Ex case C-134/97 Victoria film 
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The EU law has to be interpreted in conformity in all member states. This principle was 
established in the Von Colson case and in the Marleasing amongst others.36. 
The tax authorities (and other public authorities of the member states with similar 
influence and decision power) are also required to interpret EU law within this conformity 
even though they cannot ask for a preliminary ruling in case of confusion. Since the 
authorities that are not qualified for preliminary ruling (the ones not regarded as courts or 
tribunals in the view of EU law)37 they are left to interpret unclear EU law as best they can. 
Only after a decision has been complained about to a court by the person who is subjected 
to the decision, first then can that court ask for a preliminary ruling on the matter. 
The ECJs requirement of conformity in interpretations of a directive allows for 
interpretations within the national laws interpretation rules.  But the interpretations within 
the national laws are limited by general principles of law38  such as legal certainty and non 
retroactivity. This should mean that new interpretations should always be made in favour of 
the taxpayer, but there are cases that are giving another impression.39 
National courts should ex officio in their judgment apply rules with direct effect and 
interpret them ex officio.40 When it comes to different interpretations of secondary law it 
does not matter if one interpretation seem more logical to the wording than the other, the 
version that will prevail is the one closest to the will of the treaties.41  
3.2  AN ILLUSION OF NON INTERFERENCE  
                                                        
36 C-14/83 Von Colson, C-106/89 Marleasing, 
37 Article 267 TFEU 
38 EU skatterätt 3 upplagan Kristina Ståhl mfl Iustus förlag Uppsala 2011 p 37 refers to C-371/02 
Björnekulla - even against the prepatory works 
39 cases 369/04 Hutchinsson 3G and C321/05 Kofoed mainly AG but not contradicted by ECJ. - opinions on 
this in EU skatterätt 3 upplagan Kristina Ståhl mfl Iustus förlag Uppsala 2011 p37-38 
40  When should a national court ex officio  interpret EU law -  C-312/93 PeterBroeck and C 430/93 Van 
Schijndel 
41 purpose of the directive – read out from the treaty Denkavit C-292/94 
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The principle of shared competence mean that the ECJ should not rule over the 
interpretation of domestic rules in itself, instead they should only have opinions on the 
compatability with the EU law and its interpretation.42  
But usually they will have to say something about the domestic rule as well to be able to 
answer the question or questions that were referred, this gives of an illusion of that the ECJ 
is not interfering with domestic law per se. Guidance is though thorough and limit’s the 
room for navigation for the national court considerably.43 
The ECJ never replies to hypothetical questions. All questions referred have to concern 
real situations otherwise the workload of the court would be immense.44  
The hard evidence of a case is a matter for the national courts to investigate and rule 
upon, not anything for the ECJ to decide about; therefore they are not making a stand either 
way neither on the proof of a coincidence or on an event.45 The ECJ assumes that the parties 
involved in a case know their own domestic law and therefore the ECJ does not investigate if 
the domestic laws mentioned does actually apply, exists or should be interpreted as 
suggested in front of them. If parties to a case come unprepared about their own domestic 
situation before the ECJ they can cause misunderstandings about their national laws that can 
mean serious delay.46 
3.3  ABUSE AND TREATY ACCESS  
Abuse of rights to circumvent other rules through EU law does not affect access to court 
but can affect the outcome.47 
The ECJ have lately been in pursuit of tax avoidance, especially the attempts to avoid tax 
laws and directives by using other directives. Any attempts or suspicions of misuse seem to 
                                                        
42 C-62/97 BP soupergaz + many more. 
43 258/95 Julius Fíllibeck Söhne, C-231/94 Faaborg - Gelting Linen 
44 Amongst others  C-384/08 Attanasio group p 28, C-478/07 Budvar p 64  
45 Hard evidence, not for ECJ cases - 230/94 Renate Enkler, 127/86 Yves Ledoux, 320/88 SAFE, 230/87 
Naturally yours cosmetics. 
46 EU skatterätt 3dje upplagan Kristina Ståhl mfl Iustus förlag Uppsala 2011 p 32 ex Verkooijen C 35/98 
47 From the centros case to Halifax. Many cases and still a gray area. 
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start a response from the ECJ where legitimate expectations gets less protection than 
otherwise when it is weighed against the protection of the tax systems in the union.48 If 
someone is misusing the system it will lead to a loss of protection, but it does not lead to a 
loss of access. The ECJ leaves it to the national courts to investigate potential misuse, since 
that has to be done by evaluating the evidence of the case.49 The functioning of the market 
is linked to harmonization within the Lisbon treaty which in the field of taxation has shown 
to be more problematic than most other areas. 
Legitimate expectations are important for the ECJ,50 there should always be a real 
possibility to understand the consequences of your actions before you choose the path of 
your actions. This is also why retroactivity in law making cannot be accepted. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
48 Cadbury Schweppes, Thin Cap , Halifax (196/04, 524/04, 255/02) 
49 C-425/06 Part Service   
50 C-110/94 INZO (loss project killed) Interesting case Garage Molenheide C 405/95 (286/94, 340/95, 
401/95) 
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4.  NE BIS IN IDEM –PRINCIPLE  
Ne bis in Idem is a Latin expression meaning “not twice the same” and has been a part of 
most legal systems since before the modern legal systems that still exists today. It is usually 
understood as a prohibition to sentence someone twice for the same offence, but the 
nuances of what that actually means varies. 
The meaning and rationale behind the principle have varied over time and within 
different systems and therefore the principle have been interpreted and incorporated 
differently in different member states and there have also been inconsistencies between the 
Charter and the ECHR.   
It is applicable to situations if both proceedings resulting from the same idem51 are 
considered to be of a criminal nature. Within both the case law from the ECtHR and the ECJ 
the criterions for determining if a proceeding is of a criminal nature is decided by applying 
the so called Engels criterions, first developed in the case of Engels and Others v the 
Netherlands52 by the ECtHR.  
If a proceeding is found to be of a criminal nature and has become final, the principle of 
Ne bis in Idem is considered to preclude a second proceeding regarding the same idem. The 
notion of Idem is not completely clear or obvious and differ within the interpretations of the 
ECtHR and the ECJ as will be explained further towards the end. 
4.1  NE BIS IN IDEM IN THE ECHR 
Within the ECHR the principle is laid down within the amendment of article 4 in protocol 
no 7, that was added later and opened for ratification 1984 and a few member states to the 
EU have not ratified it yet.53  
Article 4 of protocol no 7 reads;  
                                                        
51 The same something -act, omission or event, is called Idem and will be explained below. 
52Case of Engel and Others v the Netherlands no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 further 
referred to as the Engels Case 
53 At the time of the Toshiba case it was the United Kingdoms, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands 
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Article 4 – Right not to be tried or punished twice 
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the 
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted 
or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of 
new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous 
proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 
No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention. 
The principle seems to apply only to domestic criminal proceedings and not to situations 
that contains a cross border situation since article 4 p 1 say that “criminal proceedings under 
the jurisdiction of the same State” and then the article continue to refer to a one state 
situation “procedure of that state” and also Article 4 p 2 that also concerns the penal 
procedure “of the state concerned” . 
4.2  NE BIS IN IDEM IN R ELATION TO EU  LAW  
In EU law the principle is laid down within the article 50 of the Charter which says that: 
“Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal 
offence 
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence 
for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in 
accordance with the law.” 
The wordings of article 50 of the charter is not clear, for example it only applies to 
criminal offences and criminal proceedings, but what is considered a criminal proceeding or 
offence is not explained and the same goes for what lays behind the wording of “finally 
acquitted or convicted” and it is therefore something that the ECJ has to interpret. 
4.2.2  ARTIC LE 52(3)  OF THE C HARTER  
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 “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”54 
Considering that the EU law is applicable towards cross border situations but does not 
cover entirely domestic situations at the same time as the rule in 52(3) of the Charter leaves 
the ECHR as the minimum standard but the relevant articles in the ECHR covers same state 
situations, it clearly leaves an area of interpretation left for the ECJ to clear.  
One should see the application of ECHR within the EU law as a matter of substance, what 
the ECHR demands is the minimum standard for the EU law in substance but it does not 
apply the same territory of application. The place of possible application differs. 
This relation between the ECHR and the Charter should lead to the conclusion that the 
ECtHR interpretation of the principle of Ne bis in Idem is the minimum criteria and that only 
a deviation towards a interpretation that leads to a more extensive protection for the 
individual can be allowed under EU law, though with the limitation of that article 52 (3) of 
the Charter only refer to parts of the ECHR as far as the Charter contains rights that 
corresponds to those rights. 
4.3  THE PRINCIPLE OF NE BIS IN IDEM WITHIN SWEDEN  
The discussion about the Swedish tax system and its compatibility with the Ne bis in 
Idem principle have though regarded the possibility to apply both a procedure with tax 
surcharges and another one for tax offence given that the same information and fault is used 
as the base for both procedures. 
After the Zolothukin case the Swedish supreme courts have still persisted that there is no 
conflict between the Swedish system giving a person tax surcharges administratively by 
SKV55 at the same time (or before or after) as the same person undergoes criminal 
                                                        
54 Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
55 Skatteverket – the Swedish tax authority further referred to as SKV 
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proceedings by the Swedish court for tax offences based on the same information.56  These 
decisions have been controversial and debated.57 
The Supreme court in Sweden decided on the 22nd of February 2013  to give leave for 
appeal to a case58 originating  from the first court of appeal59 that concerns the principle of 
Ne bis in Idem.60  It will be intresting to see if they will change their position on the Ne bis in 
Idem when that judgment eventually comes since it will be the first judgment on tax 
surcharges and Ne bis in Idem after Haparanda case within Sweden. Unfortunately neither 
that case nor another case that is pending before the ECtHR will be decided upon in time to 
be part of this thesis.  
 
  
                                                        
56 NJA 2010 p168 I and II 
57 Not only in the doctrinal debatebut also with descending judges in cases like NJA 2011s444 and several 
district court decisions, one of which is the case that is now pending before the Supreme Court in Sweden. 
58 The Swedish Supreme cort  case no B 4946-12 during 2013 
59 District court over Skåne and Blekinge from 2012-10-08 Case no B2102-11 
602013-05-22 http://www.hogstaforvaltningsdomstolen.se/Provningstillstand/Skattemal/   
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5.  THE SWEDISH TAX SYSTEM  
5.1  STATUS OF THE SWEDISH TAX SYSTEM WI TH SURCHARGES  
The principle of legality is part of Swedish constitution61 and is also valid for tax 
legislation. No tax can be charged that is not supported by law or that is contrary to existing 
law. The European Union law and the ECHR are valid as law within Sweden. 
Any new taxes62 have to be decided directly by the Swedish Parliament63 but it also have 
to comply with the European union treaties, ECHR and The Charter. The tax authorities in 
Sweden are allowed to make enforcement regulations as long they are not changing 
anything so it becomes materially different in the taxation.64 
Tax surcharges are now regulated in chapter 49 ff of SKL and can be added for failure to 
report taxes, mistakes in information given or deliberate given false information in the 
declaration of taxes. 
Tax surcharges after giving false information is regulated in SKL 49:11 and 49:15 and is 
added by a  fixed amount of 40% upon the final taxation that otherwise would have been 
missed or on the decided arbitrary assessment if the false information had not been 
discovered, and 20% if it regards other forms of tax such as VAT etc. There is a possibility for 
the tax authority in 51:1 SKL to reduce the amount to less or nothing if it would otherwise be 
unreasonable or excessive, or if the person have also been sentenced for a tax offence under 
SkbrL65 and the combination would amount to an unfair, not proportionate or excessive 
punishment. 
                                                        
61 The Convention of Sweden 1:1 RF all offentlig makt utgår från lag 
62 Municipal authorities can influence levels of taxation but cannot affect what is taxable. 
63 They can delegate to the government to decide upon duty taxes alone. 
64 prop 1973:90 s 203 Konstitutionell Skatterätt. Robert Påhlsson 2a upplagan, Iustus förlag Uppsala 2011 
P 26 
65 Skattebrottslagen SFS 1971:69 
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5.2  CRIMINAL SANCTIONS WI THIN SKBRL66 
§2 and 4 of SkBrL says that a person intentionally providing false information67 or fails to 
submit its declaration and by doing so have risked that the community will lose tax or even 
credit and repay incorrectly taxes to the person can be sentenced to two years 
imprisonment and if it is considered to be serious the sentence will be between 6 months to  
6 years of imprisonment. 
5.3  KLART STÖD-  CL EAR SUPPORT DOCTRINE WITHIN SWEDISH LAW  
The doctrine of Klart stöd (Clear support directly translated) have been developed 
through the praxis from the Supreme Courts in Sweden to a qualification ground needed to 
be able on background of ECtHR declare a Swedish internal legal rule to be invalid. 
The demand for “klart stöd” have according to the Supreme Court judge Stefan 
Lindskog68 been inspired from a rule in the constitution called the “Uppenbarhets rekvisit” 
that is no longer part of Swedish law.69 
The doctrine has nothing to do with the ECHR in itself and is only a rule for application of 
the ECHR developed within the Swedish legal system.  
The doctrine for “klart stöd” was first mentioned by the Supreme Court in NJA 2000 s 
622 where the court concluded that to be able to declare an internal Swedish rule invalid on 
basis of the ECHR when the convention in its wording does not give any support to declare it 
invalid, there should exist a need for a clear support for that interpretation by the praxis 
from the ECtHR. In  the later case NJA 2010 s 168 I and II the Supreme court referred back to 
NJA 2000 s 622 and remained on the position that the there was a need for “klart stöd” in 
the ECHR before a internal Swedish legal rule can be declared invalid.  
  
                                                        
66 Skattebrottslagen SFS 1971:69 
67 Orally given false information is excluded 
68 http://www.infotorgjuridik.se/premium/mittijuridiken/reportage/article155709.ece 21 maj 2013 
69 The Swedish constitiution 11:14 
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6.  RECENT DEVELOPMENT BE TWEEN THE CHARTER 70 AND THE 
ECHR.71 
 
With the Lisbon Treaty it became clear that the EU is planning to accede to the ECHR 
within a foreseeable future according to article 6 TEU so the questions regarding 
compatibility between the two protective legislations of Human rights needs to be solved 
before the accession to avoid discrepancies in application that could cause legal uncertainty.  
The principle of Ne bis in Idem in ECHR is regulated by the amendment in article 4 of 
protocol no772 and explained in the explanatory comments to it that article 4 refers to the 
National level.73  Within the European Union it has long been regarded as part of the general 
principles of law and with the encoding of the general principles in the Charter, that was 
given the same legal status as the treaties by the Lisbon treaty ,  the ECHR is given status as 
the minimum level of fundamental rights.74 In competition it is also recognized as a 
fundamental principle of community law and the PVC II case also mentioned article 4 of 
protocol no 7 for the first time in relation to competition.75 
This kinship between them affects all areas of EU law. The interpretations of EU law 
become different after an new development have been interpreted by a case from the 
ECtHR case since the ECHR is in corresponding parts  the minimum standard for the Charter76 
and the parts that does not have a correspondence in the Charter have already since before 
been declared to be  fundamental principles of general law. The ECJ though does not that 
                                                        
70 The Charter of Fundamental rights, further referred to as the Charter 
71 The European Convention on Human rights, further referred to as ECHR 
72 A few member states to the EU have not yet ratified this protocol 
73 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HTML/117.htm 23 maj 2013 
74 The Charter article 52(3) see previous chapter on the principle of Ne bis in Idem 
75 PVC II joined cases C-238/99 P - Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission (Joined cases 
C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P) paragraph 
59. 
76 Article 52(3) the Charter 
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often make reference to ECtHR case law even in cases where they are following them 
obviously. 
The question of Ne bis in Idem in competition is handled in a similar way as it is in 
relation to taxes. Certain procedures leading up to fines of a certain character that is added 
before a criminal proceeding, points to that the fines could receive the character of a 
criminal penalty pushing it towards the more protected area of hard core criminal law and 
then be incompatible with the ECHR. If they reach certain burdensome amounts or is 
stigmatizing in some way that would also qualify them under the Engels criteria as a 
punishment for a crime. 
The Toshiba case also points towards a discrepancy in opinions between the judges when 
it comes to the application of Idem and the use of the Aalborg criterions77 within the ECJ 
since the Advocate General Kokott arrived at the same end result but in a very different 
manner in her opinion than the ECJ later did in their judgment.  
In the Haparanda case the ECJ for the first time gives acess to a case that concerns an 
internal situation and not a cross border situation, be that it included rules that is 
harmonized within the EU. In this case the VAT system.  
These two latest cases from the ECJ seem to point towards that the ECJ is slowly 
adjusting within the EU to prepare for the accession to the ECtHR, an opinion I will develop 
in my conclusions. 
                              
  
                                                        
77 Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and Others v Commission paragraph 338-340 further referred to as the Aalborg case 
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7.  THE ENGELS CRITERIONS .  
Ne bis in Idem applies to situations where two proceedings fall under the criminal 
heading based on the same information and to decide if a penalty should be seen to fall 
under the criminal heading both the ECJ and the ECtHR have referred to the so called Engels 
criteria. 
In the case of Engels and Others v the Netherlands78 the so called Engel criteria was first 
formulated by the ECtHR and are a set of three basic conditions that if they are filled 
(together or separately)  the punishment falls under a criminal heading: 
“ The starting-point for the assessment of the applicability of the criminal aspect of Article 6 of the 
Convention is based on the criteria outlined in Engel and Others (Engel and Others v. the 
Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 34-35, § 82-83): (1) the domestic 
classification; (2) the nature of the offence; (3) the severity of the potential penalty which the person 
concerned risks incurring”. 
79
 
7.1  THE FIRST CRITERION  
The first criterion is according to the ECtHR the domestic classification. It should only 
serve as a starting point and is of relative weight. It is only relevant if domestic law classifies 
something as criminal but not if it does not, instead the court should than “examine the 
substantive reality of the procedure in question”80 to determine this first criterion.  
7.2  THE S ECOND CRITERION  
                                                        
78Engel and others v Netherlands (Application no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72) 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57479 
79 For key case law on article 6 EKMR and each of the Engels Criteria from The ECtHR see 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B4F32DE3-8D21-403C-87D6-
22A2F0FC34B3/0/COURT_n1946214_v2_Key_caselaw_issues__Article_6__Notion_of__criminal__charge2.p
df, further referred to as :the Article 6 Notion of “criminal Charge” from the ECtHR.  Published 2006, 
downloaded 2013-05-20 
80 P 5 of the General principles in the Article 6 Notion of “criminal Charge” from the ECtHR. 
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The second criterion is of larger importance and it has been further explained by the ECtHR 
in amongst others the Jussila case that is later explained for this essay.81 When deciding on 
the nature of the defense it should be taken into account: 
 if the rule is addressed to a specific group or has a general binding character.  
 It also should be investigated whether the proceeding in question were instituted by 
a public body that also have statutory powers of enforcement. 
 The legal rule that is questioned does it have a punitive or deterrent purpose  
 Is “the imposition of any penalty is dependent upon a finding of guilt” 82and how is 
comparable procedures classified in other states?83 
 If it causes a criminal record might be of relevance but is not decisive. 
7.3  THE THIRD CRITERION   
 The third criterion should be determined by looking at how much the 
maximum penalty of the relevant law can lead to.84 
According to the ECtHR the second and third criteria are alternative and not necessarily 
cumulative, instead it is suffice “that the offence in question is by its nature to be regarded as 
“criminal” from the point of view of the Convention, or that the offence made the person liable to a 
sanction which, by its nature and degree of severity, belongs in general to the “criminal” sphere”85  
for Article 6 to be held applicable. The ECtHR recommend a cumulative approach to reach a 
conclusion in situations where it is not possible to reach a clear conclusion of the nature of 
the offence as a criminal charge or not, by separate analysis of the Engels criteria.86 But the 
criterions are not otherwise meant to be read cumulatively.87   
All three criterions have been developed further through extensive case law. 
                                                        
81 Jussila v. Finland  no. 73053/01, § 38 
82 P 6 of the General principles in the Article 6 Notion of “criminal Charge” from the ECtHR. 
83 Means other Council of Europe Member states 
84 Third criterion in p 7 ff the General principles in the Article 6 Notion of “criminal Charge” from the 
ECtHR. 
85 P 8 Ibid 
86 P 8 ibid 
87 Ezeh and Connors v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 9665/98; 40086/98 
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8.  THE NOTION OF IDEM 
Idem in the Ne bis in Idem relates to what is supposed to be decisive for what is 
supposed to be considered the same. The ECJ and the ECtHR have developed this principle 
over time.88 In the case of Rosenqvist v Sweden89 the identity of the crime was according to 
ECtHR the decisive aspect but in the later case of Zolothukin the ECtHR developed its 
argumentation. It was the first case where they went beyond article 6 ECHR and in to article 
4 of protocol no 7 and the principle of Ne bis in Idem directly. 
Since there had been different interpretation of Idem in different case law in different 
field the ECtHR concluded that there was a need for clarity on the issue for the sake of legal 
certainty. In Zolothukin the identity of the facts of the case, based on the same or 
substantially the same facts became decisive for Idem.  
In the case Van Esbroeck90 the ECJ interpreted idem in the same way as the ECtHR in the 
Zolothukin and the result in praxis seemed to point to that the identity if the crime had 
shifted to the identity of the facts. In the Toshiba case, which concerned the principle within 
the field of competition, the ECJ though based their interpretation of idem not on the 
identity of the facts of the case but in relation to the identity of the facts of the crime, that 
took place in different territories under a different time span but related from the same 
cartel. Thus they linked Idem to the old case law of Jussila rather than the new Zolothukin 
case. 
The ECJ uses three criterions to interpret Idem that comes from the Aalborg case.91 The 
threefold condition of identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal interest 
protected, however there are discrepancies of how these are used compare to ECtHR.    
                                                        
88 SvJT 2013 s343 Svensk Jurist tidning, Dag, Victor 
89 Rosenqvist v Sweden no 60619/00 
90 C-436/04 Van Esbroeck 
91 Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and Others v Commission paragraph 338-340 further referred to as the Aalborg case 
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9.   WHAT ACCESSION MIGHT MEAN FOR THE TAX FIELD  
Article 6 ECHR about fair trial affects the amount of time waiting for trial that’s allowed, 
innocence until sentenced, proportionality between crime and punishment. In the tax field it 
has by now been clarified by the ECtHR that administrative fees due to untrue information 
given in the declaration (Sweden), is an accusation of a crime in the sense that activates the 
protection of article 6 ECHR. 
The ECHR previous position in Ne bis in Idem was revised in the case of Västberga taxi92 
read in combination with Janosevic.93 In them ECtHR concluded that tax surcharges are 
covered by article 6 ECtHR because they are deterrent and punishing and results from a 
general rule, but even if the surcharges are covered by the ECHR there still seemed to be no 
problem with surcharges, before they looked beyond article 6 ECHR and into the principle of 
Ne bis in Idem as it is enshrined in article 4 of protocol no 7 ECHR, since they were looked at 
as different crimes resulting from the same event which is not precluded. The elements of 
the crime were decisive for if it was the same crime or not. 
Västberga Taxi and Janosevic 34619/97 did cause changes in the Swedish tax law,94 
mostly that the grounds for remission was expanded.  
Criterions for what is the same offence have received a new wider meaning now and this 
new development should affect the surcharges within the Swedish tax system.  
From the conventions point view the criteria for what is  the same crime was before 
unclear but was clarified and given new meaning by the Zolothukin case.95 The principle 
about ne bis in idem does not exclude the possibility of a later sentence for the same event 
as long as it is a different offence. What matters is if identity of the facts or Idem is 
substantially the same elements or not.96  
                                                        
92 Västberga Taxi no 36985/97 
93 Janosevic no 34619/97 
94For example  5kap 14§ Taxeringslagen. prop 2002/03:106 
95 Zolothukin no 14939/03 further referred to as the Zolothukin case 
96 the Zolothukin case 
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The Swedish supreme court agrees with the view of the ECtHR that a punishment due to 
an accusation of a crime but the Supreme Court also claims that it does not go against the 
principle of ne bis in idem per se, since in their view the tax surcharge and the tax offence is 
two separate events since they are not built on the same facts of the crime. The Supreme 
Court mean that this can be drawn from the fact that to be sentenced for the tax offence 
also intent is needed whereas the tax surcharges in the Swedish tax system contains a 
presumption of bad behavior it does not require any form of intent needed.97  
ECHR position in Ne bis in Idem was revised in the Zolothukin case read in conjunction 
with the earlier case of Janosevic  the criteria for what is the same offence has been given a 
new meaning.  
  
                                                        
97 NJA 2004 s. 510 I och II 
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10.   THE CASES  
The control of taxes is considered to be within the sovereignty of the state and tax 
proceedings are still considered to be under the hard-core of private law,98 and thus ECHR 
and/or EU law is not applicable unless something outside of the tax matter gives it access, 
like a cross border situation or a situation within a harmonized field. 99 
I will present the cases in the order they were delivered with the ECtHR case law first, 
this is to make the analysis of the development through them that comes after more logic.  
10.1.  JANOS EVIC  
The ECtHR in Janosevic100 considered tax surcharges to be of a criminal nature and 
therefore the domestic court had breached article 6 ECHR when they denied Janosevic an 
oral hearing101 and since the tax surcharges was considered of a criminal nature it activated 
the access to court within the scope of civil rights and obligations102  Already in the Janosevic 
case the applicant had applied for a judgment over alleged breach of the Ne bis in Idem 
principle within article 4 of protocol no 7 of the convention, but since it was omitted too late 
in the proceedings the court did not look into the question in its judgment from 2002.  
After the cases of Janosevic vs Sweden and Västberga Taxi AB103 it was clear that rules of 
surcharges in Sweden falls within article 6 ECHR since they are based on a general rule and is 
meant both to be deterrent and also to punish the offense, mainly within the second Engels 
criteria.104 The character of the Swedish surcharges have been acknowledged by the Swedish 
supreme court105 even though they deems the surcharges and the tax offences as two 
separate events that are not built on substantially the same facts since the tax offence also 
requires intent.  
                                                        
98 Ferrazzini v. Italy application no. 44759/98, Further referred to as Ferrazzini 
99 The Happaranda case 
100 Janosevic v. Sweden application no 34619/97, Further referred to as Janosevic judgement 
101 Janosevic judgement, Paragraph 59-71 
102 Janosevic judgement. 
103 Västberga Taxi no 36985/97 further referred to as Västberga Taxi 
104 See previous comments on the Engels criteria. 
105 NJA2004s 510 
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10.2   THE JUSSILA CASE 106 
The Jussila case regarded a Finish tax case where the applicant after errors in his 
bookkeeping was ordered to pay tax surcharges based on the finish authority’s arbitrary 
assessment of his income, which was deemed to be higher than the income he had declared. 
The applicant asked for an oral hearing and for some witnesses in his benefit to be heard. 
The Administrative court in Helsinki though decided after taking in some written statements 
that an oral hearing was unnecessary due to that the parties in their opinion had supplied all 
necessary information in writing and also rejected the applicant’s claims. 
The applicant then leaned on Article 6 ECHR to appeal against the Finish republic to the 
ECtHR with the main argument that he was denied a fair hearing when the court had denied 
him an oral hearing and that they thereby de facto had placed the burden of proof on 
him.107 
The court started by assessing if proceedings concerning the tax surcharges could be 
considered to be criminal within the autonomous reading of article 6 ECHR. The court came 
to the conclusion that by using the Engels criterion’s108  that even though the tax surcharges 
according to Finnish law was not considered criminal the tax surcharges they were imposed 
on the applicant as a punishment to deter from reoffending, which means they have both a 
deterrent and punitive purpose, within the second Engels Criteria. These conclusions lead to 
the Court deciding that in this part it gives the offence a criminal nature.109 “The minor nature 
of the penalty renders this case different from Janosevic and Bendenoun as regards the third Engel 
criterion but does not remove the matter from the scope of Article 6. Hence, Article 6 applies under its 
criminal head notwithstanding the minor nature of the tax surcharge”.110  
                                                        
106 Jussila v Finland Application No. 73053/01 further referred to as the Jussila case. 
107 Paragraph 1-23 Jussila, Concerning background and application 
108 As established in Engels and others v. The Netherlands 
109 Paragraph 31-39 Jussila v Finland 
110 Paragraph 39 Jussila v Finland 
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Thereafter the Court could considered whether the Finish government had ensured a fair 
public hearing in accordance with article 6, the obligation to hold a public hearing is not 
absolute and after listing reasons for when it was not obliged they concluded that tax 
surcharges are outside of the hardcore of criminal law “consequently, the criminal-head 
guarantees will not necessarily apply with their full stringency”.111 Since the finish court had not 
denied the applicant the possibility to request an oral hearing, it was deemed to be a case 
outside the hardcore of criminal law regarding a small amount of money and the finish court 
had taken the request into consideration but then decided it to be unnecessary to hold an 
oral hearing the Court agreed that the oral hearing in this case was not a necessity.112 
10.3  THE CASE OF ZOLOTUKHIN 113 
In 2009 the ECtHR finally did get in to a discussion about the principle of Ne bis in Idem in 
the case of Zolothukin.114 
Zolothukin concerned both administrative and criminal proceedings that was brought 
against mr Zolothukin due to his disorderly conduct when he unauthorized brought his 
girlfriend  into a military compound. He was arrested and according to the police report a 
drunk mr Zolothukin tried to escape and used obscene language, therefore the district court 
sentenced him to three days detention for “minor disorderly acts”, but he was also charged   
under the Criminal code for the disorderly conduct that took place before arriving to the 
police station and also in relation to his behavior during his arrest and was found guilty for 
some of the charges he was tried for under the criminal court. 
The ECtHR ruled that Article 4 of protocol no. 7 imposes a prohibition to try or to punish 
a individual twice for the same offence in criminal proceedings and even if the Russian 
district courts first proceedings in the national law was classified as administrative, they 
                                                        
111 Paragraph 43 Jussila v Finland 
112 Paragraph 48 Jussila v Finland 
113Sergey  Zolothukin v Russia no 14939/03 further referred to as the Zolothukin case  
114 The Zolothukin case. 
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were still to be considered as criminal proceedings on account of (especially) the nature of 
the offence and the severity of the penalty given.115 
The ECtHR then considered if the offences were the same and noted that the previous 
case law from ECtHR had in the past during various approaches placed the main emphasis on 
either the identity of the facts, irrespective of legal character and then that the same facts 
could give rise to different offences, or they placed it on existing essential elements that 
were common to both offences.  
This lead the ECtHR to decide that the previous different approaches lead to legal 
uncertainty incompatible with article 4 protocol no 7 and therefore decided to in detail 
define what “the same offence” for the purpose of above said article meant. 
By  examining the principle as it was set forth in different international instrument 116 
and then they concluded that article 4 protocol no 7 should be understood as prohibiting the 
prosecution or trial of an individual for a second offence if it arose out of substantially the 
same facts as those in the first offence.  
Since the only different fact in the two different proceedings that mr Zolothukin was 
subdued to, was the threat of violence against a police officer both proceedings should 
therefore be regarded as substantially the same. 
The sentence to three days detention was found to not only amount to a final decision 
since no ordinary appeal laid against it in domestic law but also that the facts that mr 
Zolothukin in the end had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings had no bearing on the 
case before the ECtHR since the facts were that he had been prosecuted twice for the same 
offence and therefore the acquittal did not deprive him of his status as a victim.117 Mr 
Zolothukin was found to have been prosecuted twice for essentially the same offence and 
                                                        
115 First Engel criteria combined with the second. 
116 For example the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Union's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights 
117 Since the a quittance had nothing to do with the fact that there was a previous sentence for the same 
offence and instead had everything to do with lack of sufficient evidence. 
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was therefore a victim of a breach of article 4 of protocol no. 7. This approach was 
confirmed by another case Ruotsalainen v Finland.118 
This means that the ECHR article 4 of protocol no 7 precludes trial for and sentencing for 
a second offence if it is build on facts that are identical or substantially identical to the first 
offence. 
10.4  THE MENARINI CASE 119 
The Menarini case is an Italian case concerning competition fines imposed on the 
company Menarini pursuant an investigation into a cartel violation regarding market sharing 
in the area of diabetes tests within Italy.  Menarini was deamed to have participated and a 
decision regarding fines was made by the competition authorities in Italy.120  The applicant 
appealed within the Italian system of law referring to the lack of full jurisdiction of the 
national administrative courts and that the penalty was illegal.121 The national Court upheld 
the decision and the applicant therefore applied to the ECtHR. 
The applicant in the ECtHR alleged that their rights under Article 6.1 ECHR was infringed 
and that they did had not been given their right to a fair, public hearing in Italy.  The Italian 
government contested their claims.   
The ECtHR started as in the earlier mentioned Jussila case122 with investigating if the 
proceeding that had taken place in Italy concerning Menarini should be considered to be 
criminal within the autonomous meaning of article 6.1 ECHR by applying the Engels criteria 
on the case.123 
And as in the Jussila case the Court noticed that fact that the anti-competitive practices 
did not constitute a criminal offense under Italian law did not have bearing on the case, as 
previously shown in Jussila. The nature of the offence itself “affect the general interests of 
                                                        
118 Ruotsalainen vs Finland no 13079/03 
119 Case A. Menarini Diagnostics srl c. Italy (Application No. 43509/08) Futher refered to as Menarini 
120 Paragraph 5-22 Menarini 
121 Paragraph 17 Menarini 
122 See Jussila v Finland above 
123 Paragraph 38 Menarini 
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society normally protected by criminal law”124 and they concluded that the fine imposed was 
essentially punishing to prevent the repetition of the behavior therefore the fine was based 
on standards pursuing an aim of both preventive and repressive nature ( mutatis mutandis, 
Jussila, § 38).125 
Considering the above mentioned and the high amount of the fine imposed the court 
found the fines to be a punishment of a criminal nature thereby rendering article 6.1 
applicable on the case.126 
The ECtHR than came to the conclusion that the review in Menarini made within the 
Italian court system was satisfying and that the reviewing court in Italy had full jurisdiction 
and that they therefore had not infringed on article 6.1 ECHR.127 
In Menarini the ECtHR confirmed the criminal character of competition law fines and 
related that both to the size of the amount and to the general character of the offence ans 
criminal, deterring and punishing, but it also accepted administrative enforcement of the 
fines, provided the existence of a procedure to request a review with another court and as 
long as such courts have full jurisdiction to do so. 
 
10.5  THE TOSHIBA CASE 128  
A number of companies had been working together in a cartel covering several member 
states and the commission imposed infringement proceedings based on the Article 81 EC 
(now 101 TFEU) and article 53 of the EEA agreement in conjunction with regulation No 
1/2003 where the companies where penalized with high fines. The Czech National 
                                                        
124 Paragraph 40 Menarini, freely translated which further reference (Stenuit c. France, cited above, § 
62(menarini authors note). 
125 Paragraph 40 Menarini 
126 Paragraph 41-44 Menarini 
127 Judgment of the Menarini. (Judge Pinto had an dissenting opinion in the matter). 
128 C-17/10 Toshiba corporation and others v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže, further referred to 
as the Toshiba Case 
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competition Authority (NCA)129 started proceedings in national court to impose fines on 
them for the infringement of national competition rule. The cartel had been in action both 
before the Czech republic became a member state of the EU. 
The case eventually got referred to the ECJ.  A big part of the case became about the 
application of Ne bis in Idem since the companies had already been fined for their cartel in 
several member states by the Commission and the same cartel was the reason for the 
proceedings in national court- The NCA related to the anti-competitive behavior that took 
place within the Czech territory prior to their accession to the European Union so the time 
and territories were different. The question was in part also what happened with the 
allocation of competences between the Commission and the national competition 
authorities due to the accession to the EU when an international cartel like this had existed 
both before and after? What infringement were the companies actually fined for in the 
Commission fines?  
The companies had been working together and formed a cartel for the worldwide 
market of gasinsulated switchgears but the cooperation between them preceded the 
accession by the Czech Republic to the EU. 
The NCA in Czech Republic only wanted to impose fines due to the implementations of 
the cartel within their territory and only for the time prior to the accession to the EU, 
however the proceedings where started after the accession and after the entry into force by 
the applicable regulation 1/2003. The question was if the accession and entry into force of 
the regulation prohibited the Czech NCA from introducing infringement proceedings. The 
court came to the conclusion that article 81 EC and article 3(1) in Regulation 1/2003 did not 
preclude the Czech Republic to start infringement proceedings based on infringement in 
their territory that took place prior to their accession. 
 But the ECJ also found that the Commission opening proceedings against a cartel under 
regulation 1/2003 does not cause the NCA of the Member States to lose their power130 to 
apply national competition laws and fine the anti-competitive behaviors and this case the 
                                                        
129 National competition Authority will be referred to as NCA 
130 Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, read in combination with Article 3(1) gave that impression 
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NCA was not in breach of the Ne bis in Idem principle according to the ECJ since the 
Commission fines were based on the effects of the cartel within the EU whereas the NCA of 
the Czech Republic was concerned with the effects within its specific territory. 
According to the ECJ the application of the Ne bis in Idem principle requires the threefold 
rule131 that they first mentioned in the Aalborg case132 and in the case at hand the identity of 
the facts were missing.133 The ECJ based the conclusion surrounding the Identity of the facts 
of that the Commission referred to the consequences of the cartel within the member states 
of the time of the European union and the EEA and the Commission also stated before the 
court that their fines was not related to findings within the Czech territory prior to it 
accretion in may 2004 134 something that also became apparent when the court looked at 
the base for the calculation of the fines.135 
In the Opinion by the Advocate General Kokott investigates the applicability of the Ne bis 
in Idem principle.136  She stated that for the competition field the Ne bis in Idem principle 
precludes “ an undertaking from being found guilty or proceedings from being brought 
against it a second time on the grounds of anti-competitive conduct in respect of which it has 
been penalized or declared not liable by a previous unappealable decision”.137  
Concerning the application of Idem she has a differing opinion than the ECJ as she 
discusses that the temporal applicability of the principle relates to when the proceedings are 
initiated and not when the crime actually took place and since the Czech Republic was 
already a member state within the EU when they initiated proceedings in 2006 they 
according to her should also be required to observe the EU-law principle of Ne bis in Idem.138 
She also meant that identity of the facts from the Aalborg case conditions was not at a 
                                                        
131 threefold condition of identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal interest protected 
132 Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and Others v Commission paragraph 338-340 further referred to as the Aalborg case 
133 Article 97-98 o the Toshiba case 
134 Paragraph 41 of the Toshiba Case 
135 the basis for calculation the turnover were based on the figures achieved by the members of the cartel 
within the EEA during 2003, that means that the figures were prior to the accession of the Czech Republic 
136 Paragraph 101-145 of the AG Opinion in C-17/10  
137 Paragraph 111 of the AG Opinion in C-17/10 
138 Paragraph 109 of the AG Opinion in C-17/10 
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lacking issue, contrary to what ECJ later ruled, instead she wanted the court to apply the 
unity in legal interest protected – the third criterion that had not previously been applied to 
the competition law of the Union which she meant led to detrimental effects for the unity of 
the EU legal order and that same criteria should apply in all areas of EU law. That also lead 
her to conclude that to understand the identity of Idem one have to start with its source for 
EU law which is that it is in large modeled on the ECHR convention and if one applies the 
importance of the third Aalborg condition also to competition law, it will lead to that there is 
an importance of homogeneity requirements that becomes applicable139 and therefore the 
interpretations by ECtHR in the Zolothukin should be applied to the Toshiba case even if it is 
a competition case.  Her perspective is to look at the Idem from the perspective of the 
material act which leads to that NCA and the Commission is punishing different time and 
territory, thus not infringing on the principle. 
The ECJ contrary to Kokott in her opinion does not at all consider the third Aalborg 
criterion of unity in legal interest protected. The ECJ find that the issues is in the first 
criterion, identity of the facts. For the ECJ there was not important when the proceedings 
were initiated but rather for what the proceedings where initiated. Therefore the Court 
found that the first Aalborg criterion was lacking.140 Since there is a difference in time and 
territory they found that the two proceedings does not concern the same Idem.  
In essential the Advocate general and the ECJ arrives to the same conclusion but they 
have very different routes to the goal.  
11.    THE HAPARANDA CASE 141 
11.1  BACKGROUND TO THE HAPARANDA CASE  
                                                        
139 Paragraph 115-120 of the AG opinion in C-17/10 
140 Paragraph 95 of the Toshiba case 
141 C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson 26 februari 2013 further referred to as the Haparanda Case 
43 
 
A Swedish roe fisherman mr Åkerberg Fransson, active in the Swedish North Sea had 
failed to declare his taxes, both in the aspect of VAT, income tax and social security charges.  
The SKV taxed him a tax surcharge that he paid and did not challenge so it became final. In 
Sweden the tax surcharges are considered to be of a administrative order.  
The Swedish prosecutor than started proceedings against mr Åkerberg Fransson for tax 
fraud with the possible outcome of imprisonment, a criminal sanction.  Mr Åkerber Fransson 
then appealed to the civil court that in essence the Ne bis in Idem principle as it could be 
read from the ECHR article 4 of protocol no 7 and the Charter article 50 together with article 
52(3) and the case law form ECtHR would preclude the Swedish court system from starting a 
second proceeding since it would lead to double punishment for the same crime. 
Since the Supreme court in Sweden had previously applied a very restricted142 and 
criticized approach to these question resulting in the HD uprising and due to the possible 
application of EU law through a harmonized area, VAT the Haparanda district court referred 
the case for preliminary ruling.  
11.2  THE ECJ  JUDGM ENT IN TH E HAPARANDA CASE .  
The first issue to come around was access to the court. 
The Advocate General Cruz Villalón did not want to give the case access to the ECJ143 and 
neither did The Swedish, Czech and Danish Governments, Ireland, the Netherlands 
Government and the European Commission144  based on that they considered it was wholly 
internal situation, i.e. the lack of a cross border situation. The ECJ said that they could only 
give interpretation to situations that were governed by European Union law,145 but not 
outside such situations. The charter is applicable to situations only when the Member States 
is implementing European Union Law.146 But also that if national legislation falls within the 
scope of European Union law they must, when requested, provide all the guidance as to the 
                                                        
142 Highlights & Insights on European taxation Year 6 no.4 Brokelind, Cecile article p 5 
143 Advocate General Cruz Villalóns Opinion in the Haparanda Case 
144 Paragraph 16 of the Haparanda case 
145 Paragraph 19 of the Haparanda case 
146 Paragraph 17 of the Haparanda case 
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interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine whether that legislation is 
compatible with the fundamental rights. The ECJ then concluded that “ In the case in point, it is 
to be noted at the outset that the tax penalties and criminal proceedings to which Mr Åkerberg 
Fransson has been or is subject are connected in part to breaches of his obligations to declare 
VAT.”147 The VAT directive148 gives the member states an obligation to penalize abuse149 and 
thereby the national courts may, and in some cases must, make a reference to the Court of 
Justice. In paragraph 29 of the judgment they are also saying that national authorities and 
courts remains free to use their own national standards of fundamental rights upon areas 
where the action of the member state is not entirely determined by the European Union law 
is but only provided that “level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the 
Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of the European union law are not thereby 
compromised”150 and they referred to paragraph 60 of criminal case decided upon at the 
same time called Melloni C399/11.   The Court concluded that “  It follows from the foregoing 
considerations that the Court has jurisdiction to answer the questions referred and to provide all the 
guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the referring court to determine whether the 
national legislation is compatible with the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the 
Charter.”151 And so they went against the AG opinion and gave access to the case.  
Haparanda tingsrätts main questions152 was whether the “ne bis in idem principle laid down 
in Article 50 of the Charter should be interpreted as precluding criminal proceedings for tax evasion 
from being brought against a defendant where a tax penalty has already been imposed upon him for 
the same acts of providing false information”.153  
The decision has to become final and the prosecution has to be of a criminal nature to be 
prohibited by the ne bis in idem principle as it is laid down in article 50 of the charter. 
                                                        
147 Paragraph 24 the Haparanda Case 
148 Article 2, 22(4) and (8) of Directive 2006/112 EC (reproduced the old sixth directive on VAT) read in 
conjunction with article 4(3) TEU 
149 Paragraph 25 of the Haparanda case 
150 Paragraph 29 of the Haparanda Case 
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152 Question 2,3,4 laid down in paragraph 15 of the Haparanda case 
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The ECJ states that a combination of tax penalties and criminal penalties due to non 
compliance with declaration obligations are not precluded per se and that the member 
states are free to choose the applicable penalties that can take both the form of either 
administrative penalties, criminal penalties or both. 154  But a tax penalty that has become 
final and which is of a criminal nature, for the purpose of article 50 of the Charter, precludes 
another criminal proceeding against the same person based from the same acts.155 
To be able to decide if a tax penalty is criminal in its nature or not they refer to three 
criterions.156 “The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the 
second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the nature and degree of severity of the 
penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur (Case C-489/10 Bonda [2012] ECR I-0000, 
paragraph 37)”.157  The Bonda case actually refers not only to the Zolothukin case but also to 
the original Engels case158 and the so called Engels criteria that are not meant to be read 
cumulatively. This directly connect the ECJ cases with the ECtHRs case law. 
The Court than concludes that it is not for them but for the national court to based on 
the Engels criterions to investigate whether the present combination of tax penalties and 
criminal penalties are contrary to those standards, “as long as the remaining penalties are 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.159 
The fifth question asked was dismissed due to its hypothetical nature.160 
The last question to reply for the court was the first question asked where the 
Haparanda district court asked if the doctrine of “klart stöd”  was compatible with European 
Union law, i.e. to have an obligation for the national court to disapply any provisions that 
were found  contrary to fundamental rights guaranteed by either ECHR or the Charter. The 
ECJ replied that even though article 6(3) TEU confirms that the fundamental rights in  the 
                                                        
154 Paragraph 33 and 34 of  the Haparanda Case referring to previous case law such as  C- 68/88 
Commission v Greece , C-213/99 de Andrade,  C-91/02 Hannl-Hofstetter 
155 Paragraph 34 of the Haparanda case 
156 These are almost word for word the same as the original Engels Criteria 
157 Paragraph 35 of the Haparanda case 
158 Engels and Others v the Netherlands 
159 Paragraph 36 of the the Haparanda case 
160 Paragraph 38-42 The Haparanda TR asked about an alternative procedure that does not exist at 
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ECHR are general principles of Union law and that article 52 (3) of the Charter says that 
“rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be given the 
same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, as long as 
the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated 
into European Union law”161  meaning that the ECJ cannot govern a member states relations 
between its national law and that of the ECHR. The ECJ can only investigate the questions 
between provisions of domestic law and that of the Charter and in that aspect it is already 
settled case law that a national court should by its own motion dismiss any conflicting 
provisions of national legislation without the need to await its setting aside by legislative or 
constitutional means.162 
The ECJ also concluded that the”  European Union law precludes a judicial practice which 
makes the obligation for a national court to disapply any provision contrary to a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Charter conditional upon that infringement being clear from the text of the 
Charter or the case-law relating to it, since it withholds from the national court the power to assess 
fully, with, as the case may be, the cooperation of the Court of Justice, whether that provision is 
compatible with the Charter”.163  
12.DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE CASES  
12.1  ANALYSIS OF THE DEV EL OPMENT OF  WHAT IS CO NSIDERED A 
CRIMINAL OFFENCE  
As explained under the chapter on the Engels Criterions of this thesis the criterions for 
interpreting if a proceeding is Criminal in its nature is based on the Engels Criterions that was 
first mentioned in the Engels case164 by the ECtHR.   
In the beginning of this millennium Janosevic and Västberga through the ECtHR 
developed the reasoning surrounding the second Engels criterion and afterwards it was clear 
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that the proceeding of Swedish Tax surcharges had the character of a punishment of criminal 
nature, since it were both based on a general rule that wanted both to punish the offender 
and also to deter him from reoffending. Jussila confirmed that tax surcharges165 derived out 
from a criminal proceeding, but also added two important things about the proceeding. First 
thing was that the minor nature of the penalty in this case166 did not affect its place under 
the criminal head by the application of the Engels criterion. The second was that the Tax 
Surcharges were outside the hard core of criminal law which led to that the full stringency of 
article 6 ECHR does not necessarily apply. It was clear that it was not only an issue of 
whether the proceedings under the Engels criterions were found to have a criminal nature or 
not. There seemed to exist a sliding scale from hard core to outside hard core criminal law 
that affected the level of protection from ECtHR with a higher level of protection the higher 
up towards hard core criminal law the situation or fine is deemed to be, and apparently the 
size of the amounts were one factor weighing in on the scale. 
 The Swedish Supreme Court accepted the reasoning about tax surcharges in itself but 
decided that the idem between tax surcharges and tax offence differed due to the 
requirements of intent for the criminal tax offences. 
In Zolothukin the ECtHR for the first time went into the discussion about the Ne bis in 
Idem principle as laid down in article 4 of protocol no 7 to the ECHR. Previous case law only 
looked at article 6 ECHR.  
Zolothukin regarded an administrative procedure within domestic law and a following 
prooceding for criminal offences. It confirmed that what the classification of the proceeding 
within national law was not decisive of its actual character, something that was also 
confirmed in the Menarini. The ECtHR got into not only the nature of the offence when 
investigating the actual character but is also looking at the severity of the penalty given, 
which for mr Zolothukin was three days imprisonment, a more sever punishment than 
receiving a fine.  The ECtHR also made it clear that it was the existence of the second 
                                                        
165 In this case it was added tax due to arbitrary assessment by the Finish State 
166 the Court in paragraph 39 of its judgment separates the minor nature of the penalty in Jussila from the 
penalty in Janosevic, which e´contrario can be read as Janosevic being a reference value for what is at least 
not considered to be of minor nature.  
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prosecution of a criminal nature that was precluded under article 4 protocol no 7 ECHR not 
the outcome of the proceedings. Mr Zolothukin was a victim even if the outcome of the 
second proceedings acquitted since he had to undergo a second proceeding. This was also 
confirmed through Routsalainen v Finland.167 
In Menarini the ECtHR weighed in the high fines on the scale to find that the punishment 
was of a criminal nature thus article 6.1 ECHR was applicable, but in the later cases of 
KME/Chalkor168and Toshiba were high amount of anti-competitive fines had been induced 
the ECJ did not discuss the amount of the fines. The Advocate General Sharpston discusses 
the fines in her opinion to the KME/Chalkor and concluded that she could not see them 
fitting within the hard core of criminal law.169 But on the same time the ECJ in Toshiba seems 
to have decided that the Commission proceedings and fines are of a criminal nature and 
therefore the principle applies if the first decision is unappealable and that there is no need 
to investigate where on the scale of hard core criminal law it exists.170 
 In Haparanda the ECJ went into the question of whether the administrative penalties per 
se was prohibited in parallel proceedings with criminal penalties and concluded that the 
member states was free to choose applicable penalties for non compliance in tax matters 
and can therby use one or both of those penalties171. But they then limited the application 
by first stating that if a tax penalty have become final and is of a criminal nature, article 50 of 
the Charter precludes a second proceeding against the same person based on the same facts 
– i.e. idem.172  
The court also said it was for the domestic court to based on three criterions to interpret 
if the proceedings and penalties are of a criminal nature or not, as long as the remaining 
penalties will be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.173 The criterions they referred to is 
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identical with the Engels criterions and they also referred back to a case called Bonda that 
directly referred to both the Zolothukin and the Engels case.174 
12.2  ANALYSIS OF THE DEV EL OPMENT OF  IDEM THROUGH THES E CA SES  
As explained under chapter 6 in this thesis the Idem is decisive for if the Ne bis in Idem 
principle applies to the situation once it is clear that the situation contains two proceedings 
of criminal nature. Not twice the same – makes an investigation into what is the same or 
idem of major importance. Even though already in Janosevic it was clear that proceedings 
adding the tax surcharges were of a criminal nature the idem was not found to be the same. 
The administrative proceedings of tax surcharges, was in the eyes of the Swedish Supreme 
court, concerned with an idem of different identity due to that the second criminal 
proceeding of the tax offences was required to at least also cover intent by the tax offender.  
In Zolothukin the ECtHR examined Ne bis in idem and tried to clarify their interpretation 
on idem. They went through several international instruments as well as their own case law 
and then concluded that article 4 of protocol no 7 ECHR precludes a prosecution in a 
situation where it arises out of substantially the same facts as those in a previous 
prosecution. Before it had been a bit unclear what was considered the same and it had been 
thought to be the identity of the Act or omission that was decisive but in Zolothukin the 
ECtHR shows that they are instead looking at the identity of the facts, that does not have to 
be identical but substantially the same. 
In Toshiba the ECJ is also looking closer at the question of idem through the Aalborg 
criterions175 that they developed in the Aalborg case regarding the Idem. Advocate General 
Kokott took the view from the perspective of the ECtHR findings in the Zolothukin that the 
issue at hand were not in the identity of the facts and focused on the third Aalborg criterion 
about unity in legal interest protected even though the ECJ had never applied this criterion 
to the competition field before. She then went into a discussion about the origin of the 
principle of Ne bis in Idem and arrived to the conclusion that the same criteria should apply 
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in all areas of EU law, homogeneity is required and therefore the interpretations by ECtHR in 
the Zolothukin should be applied to the Toshiba case even if it is a competition case.  She 
then looks at the Idem from the perspective of the material act in which the Commission and 
the Czech NCA is punishing different time and territory, thus not infringing on the principle. 
The ECJ does not follow her reasoning in this. They are not taking up the third Aalborg 
criterion of unity in legal interest protected at all instead they find that the issues is in the 
first criterion, identity of the facts. Whereas the AG started by looking at the temporal 
applicability and finding that it was when the proceedings was initiated and not when the act 
was committed that mattered the ECJ took a opposite view and said that the importance 
was rather for what the proceedings was initiated for then when they were initiated, and 
thereby they found the first Aalborg criterion was lacking.176 Since there is a difference in 
time and territory they found that the two proceedings does not concern the same Idem. 
In the Haparanda case there were no need to investigate the Idem of the case since they 
pushed the question back to the national court already on the issue of if the Swedish tax 
surcharges were criminal or not.  
  
                                                        
176 Paragraph 95 of the Haparanda case 
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  13.  Conclusions   
Clearly there are still discrepancies between both the application and the interpretation 
between the Charter and the ECHR that leads to that certain areas of EU law and also 
domestic law needs to be adjusted before the accession of the EU to ECHR can be done 
somewhat smoothly.  
The Haparanda case was the first case where the ECJ gives access to a case that concerns 
an internal situation and not a cross border situation, be that it included rules that is 
harmonized within the EU. In this case the VAT system, but the case implies that the access 
to court have been broadened to other harmonized rules within the EU that might not be of 
a clearly cross-border situation. In the future there is a possibility that the access might focus 
on whether the case at hand regards a pure domestic situation or if it contains elements 
applicable to EU law, rather than weather the situation covers a cross-border situation 
clearly covered by EU law. 
Part of the problem with the EU accession to ECHR is that EU law only covers cross 
border situations and not pure internal situations whereas the ECHR only covers pure 
internal situations. With the logic from the Haparanda case obligations by the Member 
states can give access to the court in the future177 and for the first time internal situation 
might have the right of access if it contains any substance of EU law. 
The Toshiba case also points towards a discrepancy in opinions between the judges 
within the ECJ when it comes to the application of Idem and the use of the Aalborg 
conditons178 that is used by the ECJ to arrive to weather the same Idem is in question or not. 
 Advocate General Kokott arrived at the same end result in the Toshiba case but in a very 
different manner than ECJ did.  
These two latest cases from the ECJ seem to point towards that the ECJ is slowly 
adjusting within the EU to prepare for the accession to the ECHR but on the same time there 
                                                        
177 Paragraph 25 of the Haparanda case 
178 Joined cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland and Others v Commission paragraph 338-340 referred to as the Aalborg case 
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is a lot of political sensitive issues to handle discreetly, since it will affect internal laws for all 
member states as well and some countries have not yet ratified all amendments to the ECHR 
which means that their internal domestic law is not previously adapted to the ECHR in some 
areas. Even small changes in law can lead to large economic consequences for the Member 
States. 
The Advocate General in the Haparanda case did not want to give the case access to the 
ECJ179 and neither did The Swedish, Czech and Danish Governments, Ireland, the 
Netherlands Government and the European Commission180  based on that they considered it 
a wholly internal situation, i.e. the lack of a cross border situation. The fact that some of 
those countries have similar parallel proceedings as the Swedish Tax system points to the 
fact that the judgment in Haparanda might lead to both legislative and economic 
consequences for some countries. 
The ECJ uses three conditions to interpret Idem that comes from the Aalborg case.181 The 
threefold conditions are identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the legal interest 
protected, however there are discrepancies of how these are used compared to ECtHR.  
In the case Van Esbroeck182 the ECJ interpreted idem in the same way as the ECtHR in the 
Zolothukin and the result in praxis seemed to point to that the identity of the crime had 
shifted to the identity of the facts from which the proceedings is initiated183. In the Toshiba 
case, which concerned the principle within the field of competition, the ECJ though based 
their interpretation of idem not on the same kind of identity of facts as in the Zolothukin but 
instead the facts in relation to the identity of the facts of the crime, that took place in 
different territories under a different time span but related from the same cartel. Thus they 
linked Idem to the old case law of Jussila rather than the new Zolothukin case.  
                                                        
179 AG Opinion in the Haparanda case paragraph 22 -65  
180 Paragraph 16 of the Haparanda case 
181 the Aalborg case 
182 C-436/04 - Van Esbroeck 
183 SvJT 2013 s343 Dag, Victor 
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Identity of the facts from the interpretations made with the Zolothukin case leads to 
complications in the Swedish tax field since the punishment for a tax offence in a criminal 
court is based in large on the same information that gave rise to tax surcharge. 
I have to agree with those who have previously criticized the way that the Supreme 
courts in Sweden have handled the topic of tax surcharges, in my view it should be 
remembered that Sweden has already ratified the ECHR and should follow the ECtHR 
guidance in their interpretations of their own articles. The Swedish supreme courts have 
admitted that the tax surcharges have a status as fitting under the criminal head of article 6 
ECHR but have been hiding behind the doctrine of “klart stöd” to avoid the consequences of 
applying the full stringency of the Ne bis in Idem as laid down in the article 4 of protocol no 
7. 
The doctrine of “klart stöd” is a pure domestic doctrine to be applied on Swedish rules in 
conflict with the ECHR, but it has no support in the ECHR but the doctrine has still been used 
to apply or rather to not apply the rules within the ECHR in Sweden.  
With the judgment in Haparanda the ECJ clearly states that the doctrine of “klart stöd” 
cannot be applied to EU laws in any kind of conflict with domestic law. The EU law is superior 
and conflicting rules in domestic law is invalid. The Advocate General in his opinion also says 
that even if the EU can only interpret EU law during the integration process that has to 
proceed the accession184of the EU to the ECHR this will change once the EU accedes, thus he 
implies that also in relation to the ECHR articles “klart stöd” would not be accepted in the 
future. To apply the doctrine of “klart stöd” to any valid EU law is clearly not compatible with 
the obligation to refer any situations affecting EU law that is not an act clair or acte éclair as 
was clarified long time ago in the CILFIT case.185 
Both the ECtHR and the ECJ are talking about a sliding scale of what is administratively 
induced punishments that is considered hard core criminal law186and there is implications of 
that the Ne bis in Idem applies to the whole scale but with less stringency towards the soft 
                                                        
184 Paragraph 109 of the Advocate general opinion in Haparanda 
185 See earlier discussions on the referral to ECJ. 
186 AG opinion in the KME/Chalkor case and the ECtHR in Menarini 
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core criminal law end, where at least small fines like the ones in Jussila seems to resides. In 
the other end of the scale are punishments like the imprisonment in Zolothukin.  
Menarini implies that high fines in competition can push the punishment from the Jussila 
side of soft core criminal law towards the other end even if the advocate general Sharpstone 
in KME/Chalkor could not see the fines in that competition case to fit under the criminal 
head due to their character of soft core criminal law. The ECJ seems reluctant to by its own 
motion discuss the issue and avoided it in both KME/Chalkor and in the Toshiba case. But 
both of those concerned fines in competition for anti competitive behavior by companies. A 
behavior that is covered in intent and also threatens the economic stability and goes counter 
to all the values and basic treaty rules of the Union. A private person that receive a very big 
fine in the light of the effects on the individuals private life balanced against the fact that the 
economic effect for the Union from a single individual behavior is considerably less 
dangerous than that of a cartel, might also weigh in to push such a situation further up 
towards the hard core criminal law end of the scale and thus render it more protected. 
In paragraph 36 of the Haparanda Case the ECJ seems to leave some room to maneuver 
within for the Member States to be able to keep certain fines even if they are not really 
compatible with the Ne bis in Idem – as long as they are effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. Thus they are implying that the amount of the fines should be proportionate not 
only to the offence but also to the subject of them. This might be of great importance during 
the integration process that the Advocate General Cruz villalón talks about in his opinion,  187  
to protect the member state domestic law from standing with big gaps in legislation that can 
be abused. 
The fact that the ECJ sends the question about the surcharges character back to the 
national court to investigate is probably part of the integration process where the national 
courts will have to adapt their own law and find new solutions before accession without 
stirring up to much political dust. It is a politically sensitive issue since it is not only Sweden 
that has this kind of parallel administrative and punishing systems. Hard evidence is not for 
the ECJ to examine so that gives them a possibility to avoid direct comments on the issue, 
                                                        
187 Paragraph 109 of the opinion in the Haparanda case 
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but implicitly they seem to say that a second proceeding is prohibited by the Ne bis in Idem 
principle, since they give very specific instructions on how the domestic court is to evaluate 
the character by referring to the Engels criterions. By pushing the last judgments over 
parallel systems back to national courts, each country is forced to revise their own system 
which also give some time to adapt instead, which will make for a smoother change, than if 
the ECJ would to declare them all invalid immediately through one case.  
When the Haparanda came from the ECJ it might have seemed at the first reading of the 
case that is contained a ruling that does not change much or differ a lot from status que, and 
perhaps that was the reason why some Swedish media reported the same day it came out 
that the Swedish system with surcharges could remain as it was. They probably read 
paragraph 34 of the judgment that concludes that article 50 of the Charter does not prohibit 
Member States from using a combination of tax penalties and criminal penalties and then 
they seemed to have been satisfied and stopped reading the case because after a more in 
dept reading of the judgment it does not lead to a conclusion that any form of this 
combination is cleared. 
The ECJ are not saying that all kinds of  surcharges are criminal but they are not saying 
that they are not either, rather they are saying that it depend on the circumstances 
surrounding the penalties. 
Instead the ECJ is pointing to the nature of the first penalty that becomes final and says 
that if that has a criminal nature article 50 of the Charter applies and the Ne bis in Idem 
principle prohibits a second proceeding or penalty of a criminal nature. They are also saying 
that what legal label the national law chooses to sort the penalty under does not matter 
instead the Engels Criterions188 are decisive for a conclusion on whether they are of a 
criminal nature or not. And this is where the ECJ connects its praxis for the Charter article 50 
with ECtHR praxis for the ECHR article 6 and article 4 of the 7th protocol. Together with the 
ending conclusions of the case, ruling the application of the doctrine of “klart stöd” invalid in 
connection with any aspects of EU law it means change.  
                                                        
188 By referring to C-489/10 Bonda, a Casewhere they previously referred to the Engels criterions. 
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For the Swedish Tax surcharges it seems to result in that the tax Surcharges, which the 
Swedish Supreme court already have acknowledged as being criminal in nature under the 
Engels Criterion, will be subject to the Ne bis in Idem principle where the Idem have to be 
interpreted following the Zolothukin logic, to be based on the same or manifestly the same 
identity of facts and since the need for intent in the criminal proceeding will not be 
sufficiently different to give an interpretation of two different offences and since article 4 of 
protocol no 7 takes the backdoor through the ECJ the Supreme Court can no longer apply 
the doctrine of Klart stöd in order to not apply the interpretation of Idem, at least not in 
relation to the harmonized areas of tax law, i.e VAT. The decisions of Tax surcharges that 
have become final must be seen as precluding in many cases from later criminal proceeding 
due to the criminal nature of the first proceeding and probably the amount of the fines will 
affect the outcome as well.  
Not all tax surcharges will be invalid due to this since the ECJ in paragraph 36 of the 
Haparanda case left the possibility to keep some tax surcharges to be able to maintain and 
effective, proportional and dissuasive system. At least until the accession is followed 
through. How that should be interpreted in connection to the Swedish tax surcharges 
remains to be seen but it is clear that the previous position has to be revised and that new 
aspects have to be weighed in to the picture before a decision is made. 
I would also argue that this means that different courts in different countries will have to 
handle the question differently and eventually and probably there will be new cases from 
the ECJ on the issues of Ne bis in Idem and what administrative proceedings should be 
counted as criminal proceedings and which if them remains an administrative procedure. 
It seems that the ECJ has established a road for closing the gap between the ECHR 
practices on article 6 ECHR by avoiding to rule the existing differences invalid but 
semantically moving around the issues and slowly closing the net. It almost resembles a 
harmonization process of a directive where there is a certain amount of time and lead way 
to reform one’s own laws and practices to fit within the “new EU demands”. 
By sending it back to the domestic court to make the redefining cases, will have the 
consequence of new issues of unclear practice that due to the obligation to refer will give 
the ECJ new opportunities to further close the gap another inch.  
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Both courts (ECtHR) and ECJ are careful not to rule against each other, and in parts 
where the two are not ready to meet yet they try to find other more diplomatic roads to 
their rulings. 
Once the EU has acceded to the ECHR it will be a member of that convention on the 
same merits as other members, with a possible result that decisions made by the ECJ could 
be appealed to the ECtHR unless the EU laws have been harmonized towards the ECHR by 
then.  
W.Wills suggested in an article189  that this could mean that the accession will open the 
possibility for anyone claiming that his or her rights under the Convention have been 
violated by the European Commission or the EU Courts reviewing the Commission's decision 
and they could thereby bring an application against the European Union before the ECtHR 
after all remedies before the EU Courts have been exhausted.190 
This will most probably be something the ECJ would like to avoid or even prevent.  
 
 
  
                                                        
189 2011, Woutar Wills, EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and HR, 
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